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ABSTRACT
Trading of pharma goods has attracted widespread global
attention in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic. The Agreement on
Trade in Pharmaceutical Products (“Pharma Agreement”)–a sectoral
agreement between a handful of WTO members–was concluded in 1994
and aimed to eliminate duties on various pharmaceutical products.
*

Lawyer, India.
Edwin B. Parker Professor of Foreign & Comparative Law at Columbia Law School.

**

145

146

VANDERBILT L. REV. EN BANC

[2021

Nevertheless, this is all that the Pharma Agreement does: it eliminates
duties and does not touch upon the regulatory aspects relating to
marketing of pharmaceutical goods. WTO members remain sovereign
to decide on this score, but must observe the WTO Licensing Agreement
as well as nondiscrimination. Thus, while the intensity of regulatory
intervention is a function of a WTO member’s risk aversion, members
still
have
to
ensure
that
their
intervention
does not counteract the assumed obligation aiming, roughly, to
address protectionism.
I. THE ISSUE
In their thoughtful piece, Thomas Bollyky and Aaron
Kesselheim advance an argument aimed to solve the persistent
shortages in generic drugs in the United States. 1 We want to take one
step back and provide a complementary argument regarding the
consistency of this and similar policies with the rules of the World Trade
Organization (“WTO”). We want to demonstrate why, wisely, the WTO
regime has limited scope and does not prejudge the level of risk aversion
that individual WTO members can endogenously define. The
heterogeneity of its membership is in and of itself a good reason to adopt
this attitude. This does not mean that WTO members cannot engage in
trading of pharmaceutical (“pharma”) goods with other like-minded
players without being obliged to open up trade in pharma goods on a
membership-wide basis. We explain why, even though case law on
discrimination (an amorphous term, which is the legalese for
protectionism) leaves a lot to be desired, there are solid arguments
supporting this view.
In the following sections, we explain the Pharma Agreement, the
natural place to kick-start our discussion. What we aim to do is to show
the limits of the agreement and explain why it does not prejudge the
level of risk aversion that individual members can unilaterally define.
Then, in Section III, we move to our “plat de resistance,” and explain
why agreements with like-minded players are not only plausible (from
an economics perspective), but also legally possible under the existing
multilateral regime. Section IV discusses the role of the WTO in dealing
with measures that impose restrictions on the export of pharma goods.
The form of this role could be important in determining countries’
1.
See generally Thomas J. Bollyky & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Reputation and Authority: The
FDA and the Fight over U.S. Prescription Drug Importation, 73 VAND. L. REV. 1331, 1339 (2020)
(“[S]uggesting a pathway for importing already-approved foreign versions of U.S. medications
without patent protection or other forms of exclusivity…” as a way of preventing and reducing “the
duration of off-patent drug shortages and price hikes.”).

2021]

VANDERBILT L. REV. EN BANC

147

access to pharma goods such as personal protective equipment (PPE)
kits, masks and vaccines (critical goods when faced with a pandemic)
and more broadly, their fight against the COVID-19 pandemic. Section
V concludes this response.
II. THE PHARMA AGREEMENT
A few weeks before the historic Marrakesh agreement signaling
the advent of the WTO was signed, a few of the contracting parties of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) signed the
Pharma Agreement. 2 This agreement did not make any headlines. And
yet, it accomplished no small feat: it eliminated duties on various
pharma goods, and it did so on a most-favored nation (“MFN”) basis,
even though only a few WTO members negotiated it. Thus, while
nonparticipants could still impose duties on goods covered by the
Pharma agreement, they could profit from duty-free access in the
markets of the signatories.
A. The Nature of the Agreement
The Pharma Agreement is termed in the WTO vernacular as a
“sectoral” agreement, since it concerns one sector only. This is neither
the only agreement of the sort, nor is it the exclusive privilege of the
Uruguay Round. Other sectoral agreements exist, and sometimes they
are self-standing (e.g., Civil Aviation Agreement), 3 whereas on other
occasions, the results of sectoral negotiations were embodied in the
schedules of concessions (e.g., beer, chemicals). Sectoral agreements
were signed already in the Kennedy and Tokyo Rounds as well. 4

2.
1994 Agreement on Trade in Pharmaceutical Products, Mar. 25, 1994, GATT L/7430
[hereinafter Pharma Agreement]. The original negotiators of the Agreement were Australia,
Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, European Communities, Finland, Japan, Norway, Slovak
Republic, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States. Australia removed itself from the final
Agreement later. See Communication from Australia, Trade in Pharmaceutical Products: Record
of Discussion, June 30, 1994, GATT L/7430/Add.3. The current participants to the Pharma
Agreement are Canada, the European Union, Japan, Macao (China), Norway, Switzerland, the
United Kingdom and the United States.
3.
Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft, April 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization, Annex 4(a), 1186 U.N.S.T. 15511, 1869 U.S.N.T. 4508,
https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/air-79_e.htm.
4.
World Trade Organization, Sector Specific Discussions and Negotiations on Goods in the
GATT and WTO, WTO Doc. TN/MA/S/13 at 5–7 (Jan. 24, 2005).
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B. The Scope of the Agreement
The Pharma agreement concerns goods in the Harmonized
System (“HS”) chapter 30, a few items classified in scattered HS
headings, as well as pharmaceutical active ingredients and chemical
compounds used by the pharma industry. These are described in four
annexes to the agreement, sometimes by their name, and sometimes in
combination with an HS heading. 5
Signatories agreed to eliminate tariffs and all other duties and
charges (that is, all border protection of fiscal nature) with respect to
the items covered on an MFN basis. But this is all they agreed to do.
III. TRADING PHARMA
Trade of pharma goods is of course not simply a question of tariff
protection. Regulators, for good reasons, might wish to restrict trade in
two respects: by imposing standards that imports must observe (since
pharma are “sensitive” goods), and/or by restricting the agents who
might lawfully commercialize pharma goods. 6
Since the WTO is overwhelmingly a negative integration
contract, 7 WTO members can decide on their level of risk aversion.
Considering that some pharma goods could be abused, WTO members
might restrict sales of such pharma goods by qualified agents only.
Furthermore, and more to the point, WTO members might not trust
production and marketing processes elsewhere. The U.S. Food and
Drug Authority (“FDA”) prides itself for embodying the “gold standard”
in this area. 8 Assume an extreme case, where a WTO member, say the
United States, consistently aims to approach, to the maximum extent
possible, the “zero risk” scenario. Well then, in this case, only a few
products will be allowed in its market. If, for example, there are two flu
shots, one with a sixty-five to seventy percent efficacy (immunization)
rate, and one with at least an eighty five percent efficacy rate, the
5.
See Pharma Agreement, supra note 2, ¶ 1.
6.
See E. Wesley, F. Peterson, Mechel Peggi & Guy Henry, Quality Restrictions as Barriers
to Trade: The Case of European Community Regulations on the Use of Hormones, 13 W. J. AGRIC.
ECONS. 82 (1998) (discussing how quality controls have been used in the European Union to enforce
the hormones legislation).
7.
The only common policy that WTO members agreed to is protection of intellectual
property rights, as embodied in the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights. WTO disciplines, either absolute (like necessity) or relative (like nondiscrimination or
consistency) aim to question the means employed to achieve an objective unilaterally defined by
the regulating state, but never the objective itself. WTO members remain free to set their
regulatory objectives endogenously, with no guidance from WTO headquarters.
8.
Michelle Meadows, Promoting Safe and Effective Drugs for 100 years, FDA CONSUMER
MAG. (2006).
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United States has a nonjusticiable right to privilege only the latter. In
that case, by virtue of the obligations assumed under the WTO, the
United States will be obliged to open its doors to any flu shot,
irrespective of its origin, that achieves the higher efficacy rate. To this
effect, the United States is of course, legitimized to perform inspections
and verifications (conformity assessment) to ensure that this has been
the case. When preparing and performing these procedures, it will have
to observe its obligations under various WTO agreements. 9 This is how
it all unfolds.
A. Who Should Engage in Trading Pharma?
Some WTO members have notified schemes, where they restrict
sales of goods aiming to protect public health through licensed-only
vendors. 10 They have done so for various reasons, ranging from dual use
of some goods to potential consumption externalities stemming from
using drugs without adequate explanation regarding their proper use.
It is qualified vendors (pharmacists) who are entrusted with the sale of
similar goods.
There is no bright line between automatic and nonautomatic
licensing in the WTO: the former is not precisely circumscribed, and the
latter is understood as the default category. A few questions have been
legitimately raised regarding the presence of conditions in the realm of
automatic licensing, and how their presence might blur the frontier
between automatic- and nonautomatic licensing. 11 The absence of case
law makes it quite hard to distinguish one from the other.
It is quite remarkable that case law in the WTO has consistently
established a hierarchy between a Uruguay Round Annex 1A
agreement and the GATT: when confronted with claims under both, it
would always initiate its analysis from the former, and revert to the
latter only when necessary, and in practice very rarely so. 12 But the
Import Licensing Agreement is an exception. 13 Panels have preferred to
9.
See, e.g., Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade art. 5–7, April 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1868 U.S.N.T. 120 [hereinafter
TBT Agreement].
10. See PETROS C. MAVROIDIS, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE WTO
AGREEMENTS ON TRADE IN GOODS 15–16 (2016) (offering examples of such schemes focused on
public health, such as the Korean import licensing scheme).
11. See MAVROIDIS, supra note 10, at 11.
12. See Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and
Products Containing Asbestos, ¶¶ 80–81 WTO Doc. WT/DS135/AB/R (adopted April 5, 2001)
[hereinafter EC–Asbestos]. See also Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Trade
Description of Sardines, ¶ 7.15, WTO Doc. WT/DS231/AB/R (adpted Oct. 23, 2002).
13. Appellate Body Report, Argentina – Measures Affecting the Importation of Goods, ¶ 6.448,
WTO Doc. WT/DS438/444/445 (adopted Jan. 15, 2015).
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review the well-founded of claims within the four corners of the GATT,
without entering into the realm of the disciplines embedded in the
Import Licensing Agreement. 14
As mentioned, this has not stopped WTO members from
restricting sales of pharma goods through some channels only.
B. Whose Pharma Do You Trust?
“Trust, but verify,” is a phrase associated with U.S. President
Reagan in his dealings with Soviet Union, the then fading superpower
In a similar vein, WTO members retain the right to verify that imports
exhibit the product characteristics indicated, for example, in their
labels. They might want to engage in similar practices particularly in
the realm of pharma trade, where meeting the product characteristics
makes all the difference when it comes to measuring their effectiveness.
Inspection and verification are legitimate instruments
irrespective of whether there is a harmonized or diversified process of
production. We can distinguish between the following possibilities, at
least in principle:
A. Home and Foreign produce pharma goods following their
divergent regulatory paths;
B. Home and Foreign have harmonized their production
processes;
C. Home and Foreign produce, as in (A), but have concluded a
mutual recognition agreement (“MRA”), whereby they
recognize each other’s standard as equivalent to their own;
D. Home and Foreign, besides (C), have also concluded an MRA
whereby they recognize each other’s conformity assessment
procedures as equivalent to their own.
(D) is of course the most trade-facilitating avenue. All that the pharma
producers in Home and Foreign have to do, to be in a position to export
to the other country, is to certify at home that their product conforms
to the national production standard. They have, thus, concluded two
recognition agreements: one recognizing each other’s production
standard, and a different one recognizing each other’s conformity
assessment procedures. The latter are referred to in literature as
MRA+, and were an integral part and parcel of the now defunct

14. See, e.g., id. at ¶¶ 6.361, 6.505, 6.511, 6.517, 6.523, 6.529, 6.535, 6.540, 6.543; Panel
Report, Indonesia – Importation of Horticultural Products, Animals and Animal Products, ¶¶
7.352–7.353, WTO Doc. WT/DS477/R (adopted Nov 22, 2017).
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Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (“TTIP”) initiative,
between the European Union and the United States. 15
Compared to (D), all the other options represent an increase in
transaction costs. They all share one feature: Home (or Foreign) will be
verifying whether the goods imported meet the standard, even when
they trust each other’s standard, as in (C). This means that, upon
exportation, there is uncertainty as to transaction costs. Indeed, the
extreme point is that there is looming uncertainty as to whether there
will be trade at all, since Home (Foreign) might find that the imported
good falls short of their regulatory requirements, and order that it is
shipped back to the country of origin. (D) provides the necessary
certainty as to transaction costs and guarantees that gains from trade
will be realized. 16
Finally, (C) and (D) allow for gains from innovation to be
collected. They create certainty as to transaction costs as does (B), but
they also provide Home and Foreign with the incentive to compete
in the production of goods, with respect to their respective
regulatory regimes.
But of course, (B), (C), and (D) could concern only a subset of the
WTO membership. How can this square with MFN, the quintessential
element, indeed, the foundational stone of the WTO edifice? We turn to
this question next. Before doing so though, let us briefly address (B). (B)
could be either bilateral or multilateral. The latter is comprehensively
addressed in the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (“TBT
Agreement”), and Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
(“SPS Agreement”). 17 Suffice to state that, to the extent an
international standard can serve the regulatory objective of a WTO
member, resort to it is compulsory. In case of deviation, the complainant
will have to demonstrate that the regulating member did not observe
necessity, or nondiscrimination. In the case of measures coming under
the aegis of the SPS Agreement, WTO members need to ensure that the
measures comply with the obligations to ensure consistency by basing
their measures on scientific risk assessment, or, in its absence, by

15. See MAVROIDIS, supra note 10, at 431. See also Thomas J. Bollyky & Anu Bradford,
Getting
to
Yes
to
Transatlantic
Trade,
FOREIGN
AFFS.
(July
10,
2013),
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2013-07-10/getting-yes-transatlantic-trade
[https://perma.cc/V2UL-5LQE].
16. Trade agreements are, of course, the means to combat uncertainty. For a recent
reiteration of this intuition, see Nuno Limão & Giovanni Maggi, Uncertainty and Trade
Agreements, 7 AM. ECON. J.: MICROECONOMICS 1 (2015).
17. See TBT Agreement, supra note 9, at art. 2.4, 2.5, 2.6; Agreement on the Application of
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures art. 3, April 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 493.
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observing the statutory requirements for lawful adoption of
precautionary measures.
The legal test for bilateral harmonization is akin to the following
discussion, as the only point to debate is to what extent bilateral
harmonization observes or circumvents the cardinal obligation
assumed under the WTO, namely, MFN.
i. Recognition and Nondiscrimination
Is recognition akin to conditional MFN? The latter concept has
been in the radar screen of U.S. trade policy for many years, as Douglas
Irwin explains in his unparalleled volume on this subject. 18
Case law had not managed to provide an unambiguous response
until recently, when in EC-Seal Products, the Appellate Body seems to
have closed the door to whatever doubts had remained. In this report,
the now extinct Appellate Body ruled that distinctions unrelated to
origin are lawful, if they do not negatively affect competitive conditions
for like products. 19 The key is the term “like product,” and in ECAsbestos, the same Appellate Body had endorsed the “reasonable
consumer test”: two goods are like products if a reasonable consumer
would treat them as such. 20 In this latter case, a reasonable consumer
would never privilege, in the Appellate Body’s view, a health-impairing
over a health-protecting good. Note that the degree of impairment, and
the relative price of the two classes of goods, were not criteria for
determining likeness in this decision.
The combined effect of these two reports should lead us to
conclude that, in principle, conditions relating to meeting a certain
health objective do not violate the MFN obligation. What could violate
MFN is only serving one sauce for the goose, and another for the gander:
if two pharma goods originating in two different countries both meet
the standard, then both should be allowed in the market.
How does all this work with MRAs?
Recall, there are two salient elements in case law, and they must
be cumulatively satisfied:
A. Conditions for granting an advantage must be unrelated to
the origin of the goods involved; and

18. See DOUGLAS A. IRWIN, CLASHING OVER COMMERCE: A HISTORY OF US TRADE POLICY 365
(2017).
19. Panel Report, European Communities – Measures Prohibiting the Importation and
Marketing of Seal Products, ¶¶ 5.90, 5.93, WTO Doc. WT/DS401/5 (adopted March 15, 2011)
[hereinafter EC–Seal Products].
20. EC–Asbestos, supra note 12, at ¶ 122.
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B. They should not affect competitive conditions across like
goods.
We now know that “like goods” will not be judged as such by
uninformed, but by reasonable, consumers. 21
Is a recognition agreement, say between the United States and
Canada, regarding pharma goods, irrespective of whether we are
dealing with generic or branded drugs, an advantage related to the
origin of pharma goods? It seems that this is the question that needs to
be addressed.
There should be no doubt that a recognition agreement is a trade
advantage. An MRA absolves participants from a procedural step that
is necessary (but might be insufficient) to access a foreign market.
Why would the United States enter into a recognition agreement
with Canada, and not another WTO member? What is so special
about Canada?
For starters, recognition is based on a rough notion of
equivalence, a relative notion par excellence. The benchmark is
provided by the regulatory framework of the recognizing state. A very
risk averse nation will recognize as equal another risk averse nation,
whereas a risk neutral nation will not be that picky. Homogeneity
across players holds the key in predicting the dyads where recognition
will occur. Juan Marchetti and Petros Mavroidis established a list of
criteria (ranging from per capita income to quality/type of legal regime),
which they used as proxies for homogeneity across players. 22 They then
examined recognition agreements concluded in the realm of services
trade: the higher the number of tabs a dyad was kicking, the likelier it
became to sign a recognition agreement.
Second,
recognition
agreements
are
forward-looking
instruments. It is not past experience that inspires them. It is
confidence going forward. This means that what matters is not just past
performance. It is the trust that, in the future as well, a certain level of
performance will be attained. 23 It is trust about outcomes, based on

21. It is irrelevant whether we agree or not with the findings in EC–Asbestos. EC–Asbestos,
supra note 12, at ¶ 122. The purpose of our exercise is to discuss legality from the perspective of
WTO law as it now stands, e.g., as contemplated through case law (in the absence of authoritative
interpretations in this respect, as per Article IX of the Agreement Establishing the WTO), and not
as how the law ought to have been understood.
22. Juan A. Marchetti & Petros C. Mavroidis, I Now Recognize You (and Only You) as Equal:
An Anatomy of (Mutual) Recognition Agreements in the GATS, in REGULATING TRADE IN SERVICES
IN THE EU AND THE WTO: TRUST, DISTRUST AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 415–443 (Ioannis Lianos
& Okeoghene Odudu eds., 2012).
23. See the excellent analysis of Paola Sapienza, Anna Toldra-Simats & Luigi Zingales,
Understanding Trust, 123 ECON. J. 1313 (2013), on this score.
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trust on future conduct pursued, and the conviction that the observed
conduct will continue to obtain in future times as well.
Under the circumstances therefore, choosing Canada looks like
a rational choice for the United States. The density of regulatory
intertwining between the two countries is quite remarkable, and the
Council of Regulatory Cooperation, a forum where regulatory concerns
are being discussed by the two partners before laws are even enacted,
is the hallmark of this relationship. 24
But all recognition agreements must, of course, observe MFN.
So an eventual MRA (and/or MRA+) between the United States and
Canada must also observe MFN. This is so, since Canada definitely
receives a trade advantage, as described above, by signing an MRA with
the United States (and vice versa).
Indeed in US-Shrimp, the Appellate Body held that offering the
opportunity even to sign an agreement to some but not to all WTO
membership constituted a violation of the requirement for
evenhandedness (another way for nondiscrimination). 25 If offering the
opportunity to sign an agreement suffices to find a violation of
nondiscrimination, all the more so the actual signing of a
contractual arrangement.
Indeed, the term “advantage” has been interpreted broadly
under WTO case law 26 This is, of course, consistent with the standard
of review adopted in similar cases: to protect not actual trade outcomes,
but competitive conditions.
We stated above that a number of MRAs have been signed by
various WTO members. The WTO itself encourages the signing of
recognition agreements (see for example, Article 6 of the TBT
Agreement). 27 No one has challenged the consistency of similar
agreements with the WTO so far. We cannot state with any certainty
whether this is because they are all WTO-consistent. What is clear
though is that complainants have the burden of production of proof, and
they face a formidable burden of persuasion as well. We explain this in
the following section.

24. MAVROIDIS, supra note 10, at 386.
25. Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp
Products, ¶ 171-17, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R (adopted Oct. 12, 1998); Appellate Body Report,
United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, art. 21.5 – Malaysia,
¶ 122,
26. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive
Industry, ¶ 84, WTO Doc. WT/DS139/AB/R, WT/DS142/AB/R (adopted May 5, 2000).
27. TBT Agreement, supra note 9, at art. 6.
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ii. Nondiscriminatory Recognition: Untested in WTO Case Law
Assume a third country challenges the MRA between Canada
and the United States, and requests its extension to it. It is clear that
the complainant has the burden of production of proof. 28 The
complainant will have to make a prima facie case that the advantage
granted to Canada (or the United States) must be extended to it
automatically and unconditionally.
The term “unconditionally,” appearing in Article I of the GATT
(MFN), emerges as the key term. 29 Case law has been far from clear and
internally coherent on this score. In EC-Seal Products, the Appellate
Body held that distinctions unrelated to origin are legal, if they do not
negatively affect competitive conditions for like products. 30 Are two
drugs, tested differently, marketed differently, the conformity of which
has been assessed in different ways, like products?
We submit that, even in the worst-case scenario, i.e., even if
complainant manages to prevail in its claim under Article I of GATT, it
will not prevail overall. This is so because of the chapeau of Article XX
of GATT (General Exceptions) to which Canada (or the United States)
will seek justification. 31 According to the chapeau, evenhandedness
(nondiscrimination) must be obtained, between countries where the
same conditions prevail. How many countries look like Canada? How
many countries can claim that they have enjoyed the same intensity
and quality of regulatory cooperation with the United States? And
recall, recognition is a forward-looking instrument. Complainants will
have to rebut evidence provided by Canada (or the United States) to the
effect that their preexisting cooperation was the main reason why they
could trust each other’s future regulatory practices.
The burden of persuasion is thus quite high and is in and of
itself, a deterrent factor against frivolous legal challenges.
Additionally, of course, there must be awareness that rational
actors would not engage in repeat interaction (the natural consequence
of signing MRAs and MRAs+) for protectionist reasons. Why would any
nation inflict on itself a recurring cost, deviating from more efficient
sources of supply? At best (from the complainant’s perspective)
recognition agreements are signed on mixed motives. Rationally, the
complainant should anticipate a deferential standard of review by
28. Panel Report, United States – Measure Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and
Blouses from India 14, WTO Doc. WT/DS33/R (adopted Jan. 6, 1997).
29. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. I:1, Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 194
[hereinafter GATT].
30. EC–Seal Products, supra note 19, at ¶¶ 5.9, 5.93.
31. GATT, supra note 29, at art. XX.
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judges, who might find it a quixotic test to distinguish wheat from chaff
in similar scenarios.
The better arguments, thus, are in favor of staying away from
litigating, unless it is for the most egregious cases. As stated above
though, empirical accounts like that offered by Marchetti and Mavroidis
suggest that recognition agreements are routinely signed by
homogeneous players, as it should be expected to happen. 32
IV. DISCRIMINATORY EXPORT QUOTAS ON PHARMA GOODS
The recent appointment of Dr. N’gozi Iwuela Okoji as the
Director General of the WTO has sparked new interest on this issue
because of her prior involvement in this issue through Global Alliance
for Vaccines and Immunizations (“GAVI”). The problem in a nutshell
is this. Import and export quotas are banned by the GATT Article XI,
which can be imposed only upon demonstration of good cause, and
assuming that impositions of quotas observe nondiscrimination. 33 But,
whereas the GATT included detailed disciplines regarding the
(nondiscriminatory) treatment of import quotas, there is nothing in
terms of statutory language explaining what nondiscriminatory export
quotas should amount to. In part, this is due to the intellectual difficulty
in designing nondiscriminatory export quotas, a point already
illustrated by Henrick Horn and Mavroidis. 34 It is also due to the
absence of practice when the GATT was being negotiated.
Against this background, those who cannot produce vaccines,
can hope that they will be spared from export restrictions. And they
received some help from COVAX, an initiative put together by the
World Health Organization, Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness
Innovation, and GAVI, which distributed vaccines to Ghana first, and
eventually to others as well. 35 The new WTO Director General, who had
until recently been the Chairperson of GAVI, seems keen to see a role
for the WTO in COVAX, if we judge by her nomination speech. 36 But
what would that role be? In Horn and Mavroidis’s line of thinking, the
32. See Marchetti & Mavroidis, supra note 22.
33. GATT, supra note 29, at art. XI.
34. Henrik Horn & Petros Mavroidis, Guest Post: What’s Sauce for the Goose is not Sauce for
the Gander? On Discriminatory Export Quotas for Vaccines, INT’L ECON. L. & POL’Y BLOG (Feb, 27,
2021), https://ielp.worldtradelaw.net/2021/02/guest-post-whats-sauce-for-the-goose-is-not-saucefor-the-gander-on-discriminatory-export-quotas-for.html.
35. COVAX Vaccine-sharing Scheme Delivers First Doses to Ghana, BBC (Feb. 24 2021),
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-56180161.
36. DG Okonjo-Iweala: WTO Can Deliver Results if Members “Accept We Can Do Things
Differently”,
WORLD
TRADE
ORGANIZATION
(March
1
2021),
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/spno_e/spno1_e.htm (full text of the speech).

2021]

VANDERBILT L. REV. EN BANC

157

GATT will either have to be observed, and thus outlaw all
discriminatory export quotas of medicine, like, for example, those
practices by the European Union, 37 or be “completed” by adding
provisions to address the issue of nondiscriminatory export quotas in a
detailed manner. 38 The latter has the merit that it will preempt
unwarranted judicial discretion, which could occur if WTO judges are
left on their own, in the current state of affairs, with no guidance as to
what nondiscrimination is. Should they, for example, be inspired by the
discipline in Articles I/III GATT, or by that in the chapeau of Article XX
of GATT? The latter makes room for countries in dissimilar position
(e.g., those in need to import vaccines, and those in no similar need),
whereas the former does not. Of course, as it has been the case with the
Pharma Agreement that we discuss in this paper, nothing stops the
membership from entering into an ambitious negotiation to address the
COVID-19 pandemic (and similar future occurrences, which, we are told
by scientists risk seeing the light of day in the future) head on. In this
case, the WTO will have to adopt a realistic approach. The multilateral
legislative function is moribund, and some might see a similar
negotiation as a proper forum for incongruous quid pro quos. The
trading community should reflect on the merits of a plurilateral
approach, as originally advocated by Bernard Hoekman and
Mavroidis. 39
V. CONCLUSION
In more than one way, trading of pharma goods is a precursor, a
harbinger indeed of things to come. In a world where tariff protection
has become irrelevant, markets are being segmented by regulatory
barriers. Even though some tariffs in some markets in some countries
still exist, the overall impact of tariffs on world trade has been, by any
reasonable benchmark, in freefall during the last years. The occasional
tariff hikes, like the ones we have experienced recently in the SinoAmerican trade war, are transitional.
Regulatory barriers can be erected at any time by any WTO
member. The very purpose of the GATT (and of the WTO) was not to
bring about an instrument for deregulation. The purpose of the
GATT/WTO is to combat discrimination (legalese for protectionism).
Nondiscrimination concerns the application, not the innate nature of
37. Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/111, 2021 O.J. (L 311) (making the
exportation of certain products subject to the production of an export authorization).
38. Horn & Mavroidis, supra note 34.
39. Bernard M. Hoekman & Petros C. Mavroidis, WTO ‘à la carte‘ or ‘menu du jour‘?
Assessing the Case for More Plurilateral Agreements, 26 EUR. J. INT’L L. 319, 342 (2015).
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regulatory interventions. For good reasons, the GATT/WTO is a
negative integration regime, hence, it is unrealistic to believe that a
deeper form of integration is feasible on a membership-wide basis.
Deeper integration is, on the other hand, necessary for market
access to happen. Indeed, nondiscrimination is an empty shell for a
country which cannot meet the higher regulatory standards of its
preferred export market. But deeper integration, especially in the form
of recognition, requires more than a willingness to integrate. Unlike
(international) harmonization, there is no common agent, where
policies are negotiated and concluded. In a harmonized context, the
outcome is owned by all participants. In a recognition context Home
cannot influence the shaping of policies in Foreign. It places its trust in
the manner in which Foreign’s regulatory process will work in the years
to come.
One can thus easily understand why similar schemes cannot be
WTO-wide. Sapir noted correctly, in our view, that the rise in free trade
areas (“FTAs”) coincides with tariffs worldwide being at an all-time
low. 40 Their content, as reported in dozens of accounts, is eminently
regulatory. And FTAs very often include recognition in one form or
the other.
One way to look at FTAs is as expression of variable geometry.
This is precisely what recognition agreements are all about. There is
trade regionalization, albeit at a lower scale. And unlike FTAs, MFN
must be observed. Variable geometry is the only realistic way forward
in a world where trade is segmented by nontariff barriers, which, unlike
tariffs, usually pursue a regulatory objective (and market segmentation
is often the collateral damage). Hoekman and Mavroidis have argued
that this is probably the most appropriate means for WTO to keep its
relevance. 41 Unlike FTAs, plurilateral agreements, for example, keep
the umbilical cord to the WTO intact. This is particularly true in the
case of recognition agreements, which, anyway, must observe MFN.

40.
(1998).
41.

André Sapir, The Political Economy of EC Regionalism, 42 Eur. Econ. Rev. 717, 727
Hoekman & Mavroidis, supra note 39, at 342.

